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DEVELOPMENT OF THE
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
ADAPTING WATER ALLOCATION POLICIES TO
SEMIARID ENVIRONS

]. DAVID AIKEN
streamflow and the wide variations in precipitation have required adaptation of traditional
water allocation principles to the new environs. The repudiation of the common law
riparian doctrine in favor of the new and
distinctly American appropriation doctrine is
one of the colorful stories of the Old West.
This new water allocation doctrine has created
problems, notably groundwater depletion,
however, even as it has solved others. The lack
of water in the Great Plains and the West has
also led to substantial governmental regulation
and development, to a surprising degree in
view of the traditional western ideology of
rugged individualism.

One hallmark of economic development, and indeed of civilization itself,
may be found in the rules men devise to
order their access to resources. When
ambitious men began to develop the West,
they found English common law deficient
in many respects. It failed to provide
workable rules among men as they struggled
to get, develop, and use water where water
was relatively scarce and often vital to life
itself. So new laws and new institutions had
to be developed. They are still developing. I
Water has been an important limiting
factor in the economic development of the
Great Plains. The Great Plains region is
characterized by its unreliable precipitation
and arid climate. The absence of abundant

COMMON LAW RlPARIANISM

The riparian doctrine of water allocation
originated in Roman law, and was developed
in English and American common law (i.e.,
through court decisions, not through legislation).2 The basis of riparian law is that only
those whose land borders a stream (called
riparian land from the Latin ripa, bank) have a
right to use its waters. According to the
riparian doctrine, all others who use the
stream are considered trespassers.
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Another feature of the riparian doctrine is
worth noting. Nonriparians could use water
with a riparian's permission, but they could be
stopped by any other riparian, regardless of
whether their use interfered with that of any
riparian. To prevent a nonriparian's use from
becoming a prescriptive right, a riparian, even
if not currently using water, was forced to
enjoin legally any nonriparian's use. The
riparian would do so to maintain the option of
initiating a new water use in the future. Failure
to object to a nonriparian's use within a
certain period of time, typically ten years,
resulted in loss of the legal ability to object to
the use. The nonriparian would then have
obtained a prescriptive right to use streamflow.
The ability of riparians to prevent nonriparians from using water, even though the nonripari an use did not interfere with an existing
riparian use (characterized as the dog in the
manger feature of riparian rights), is difficult to
justify when water supplies are scarce.
The major water uses in England before the
Industrial Revolution were limited primarily to
domestic uses and impoundments for running
small gristmills. England's humid climate
meant that water availability was not a problem for most uses. The use of water for water
power, the only significant high-volume riparian water use, resulted in the English "natural
flow" version of the riparian rights doctrine.
Under the natural flow doctrine, every riparian landowner was entitled to the full flow of
the stream without diminution in quantity or
quality. Any significant water diversion for
nondomestic purposes could be enjoined by a
riparian landowner further downstream. The
natural flow rule essentially prohibited any
significant diversion of water from the stream.
This rule was followed in England and in
nearly all the eastern states.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, water power was no longer the preeminent power source, and the prohibition
against water diversions made less economic
sense. This change led to the development of
the American "reasonable use" version of the
riparian doctrine. The reasonable use doctrine

allowed significant water impoundments or
diversions if they were "reasonable" in relation
to the needs of other riparians on the stream.
Thus streamflow could be significantly reduced
for economic purposes. Most eastern states
that do not have water allocation statutes
follow the reasonable use doctrine.
The riparian rights doctrine was developed
in England's humid climate. It is primarily
concerned with settling the rather infrequent
conflicts among neighboring riparian landowners sharing a generally abundant supply
rather than with allocating or rationing rights
to use scarce water supplies on a regional basis.
This geographical difference is the major
reason the riparian rights doctrine is found in
the humid eastern and midwestern states but
not in the semiarid and arid plains and
western states.
PRIOR ApPROPRIATION

Although riparian law is the traditional
basis of American water allocation law, it has
had serious shortcomings when applied to an
arid region. First, in semiarid and arid regions
nonriparians needed access to streamflow just
as riparians did. Second, private litigation was
not an efficient way to resolve annual wateruse conflicts when western streams were inadequate to meet the demands placed on them.
Finally, a riparian's need to maintain control
over future water use by consistently excluding
the nonriparian could not be justified in arid
areas where the demand for water was great.
These factors were sufficient to guarantee that
alternative bases would be established to
allocate scarce water supplies in arid and
semiarid environments.
Under the appropriation doctrine, rights to
use water were based not on owning riparian
land but rather on actually using water for
domestic or some economic purpose. As
discussed below, conflicts between appropriations were resolved on the basis of temporal
priority: the appropriator initiating his water
use first (the "senior" one) was entitled to
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water at the expense of those "juniors" whose
uses were initiated later. 1 This doctrine of first
come, first served was first recognized as an
extension of mining camp customs regarding
claims to water rights. 4 Court decisions in
California and Colorado, and the first administrative appropriation statute in Wyoming,
established the basis for water law throughout
the Great Plains and the West.
The California gold rush led to the first
reported court decision embracing the appropriation doctrine. To understand this decision,
one must also understand the development of
the 1849 gold rush. After the discovery of gold
at Sutter's Mill in 1848 the population of
California increased a hundred fold as fortyniners came West to make their fortune. At
this time much of California had not been
homesteaded and was still in the public
domain. Since the miners did not homestead
the property, legally they were trespassers on
the public domain. Early prospectors rarely
came into contact with one another and there
was no reason to stake a claim or file a notice
of discovery. Typically, if a miner made a strike
he would stay and work it to the greatest
extent possible. When he had to quit he would
leave his tools on the ground, which served
notice to all that this particular gold strike had
been appropriated. As McGowen notes,
"When disputes did arise, the gun proved to be
an entirely adequate method of adjustment."5
When the forty-niners arrived, these relaxed customs were no longer suitable. The
tendency of early miners to monopolize local
diggings was resented by the later comers, who
reasoned that all miners were trespassers on
the public domain and that no trespasser had a
superior right to another. This situation
resulted in violence replete with claim disputes, claim jumping, and private wars, after
which the mining camp custom developed that
a miner could claim only as much land as he
could work. The first miner to stake a claim
could keep it as long as he was actively
working it. But if the miner quit the claim it
was available to others.
Water played an important role in the

development of mines, particularly placer
mines, in which gravel was washed in sluice
boxes hundreds of feet long to separate it from
the gold. Often water would be transported
great distances from the stream to the placer
mine. This gave rise to ideas of prior appropriation: that a right to use water, including
nonriparian use, could be established by
appropriating the water for use; and that the
claims of earliest users would be superior to
those of later users. These mining camp water
customs, based on mining claim customs, were
judicially adopted by the California Supreme
Court in the 1855 decision of Irwin v. Phillips.6
The California Supreme Court later limited application of the appropriation doctrine
to land in the public domain and applied the
riparian doctrine to privately owned lands,
resulting in a hybrid system of riparian and
appropriative rights. 7 This "California doctrine" approach of legally recognizing both
riparian and appropriative rights was followed
in the Great Plains states of North Dakota,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Texas.
The Colorado Supreme Court, however,
rejected the riparian doctrine entirely and
adopted the principle of prior appropriation as
its common law (i.e., judge-made law) rather
than the English common law of riparian
rights. s The "Colorado doctrine" of recognizing appropriation water rights was followed in
the Plains only by Colorado itself, Montana,
Wyoming, and New Mexico.
Although the California and Colorado
court decisions established a common law
basis for appropriation, this system had limitations. The court decisions established that
water could be appropriated and that senior
appropriators, as against junior ones, would be
entitled to water during shortages. However,
the system relied solely on litigation for its
enforcement. Priorities still had to be established and enforced against junior appropriators through litigation. Thus, common law
appropriation protected the early use of senior
appropriators, but those rights could be enforced only through cumbersome, time-con-
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suming, and expensive litigation. Moreover,
prospective appropriators had no convenient
way to obtain information regarding the rights
of senior appropriators short of physically
surveying the entire stream. These shortcomings led to the development of administrative
appropriation, pioneered in Wyoming.
The Wyoming statute, enacted in 1890,
established a state engineer who would have
primary responsibility for administering the
appropriation statutes. All those who wished
to appropriate water were required to apply to
that officer for a permit, and only those
applications that received permits could be
developed. Appropriation applications could
be denied when denial would be in the public
interest. Pre-statutory appropriators were required to file their claims with the state
engineer for adjudication regarding quantity
and priority date. All appropriations would be
on record with the state engineer, who could
administratively cancel appropriations for
nonuse.
The Wyoming statute had many advantages over common law appropriation. Information regarding outstanding priorities and
quantities appropriated was available from the
state engineer. These centralized appropriation
records allowed prospective appropriators to
make a reasoned assessment as to whether
there was water available for appropriation.
The engineer could deny permission for unwise appropriations. Unused appropriations
would become available to new appropriators.
But from the appropriator's perspective, the
most important feature of the Wyoming statute was administration of priorities. A senior
appropriator who was not receiving all the
water that he was entitled to would contact
the state engineer's office. An official from the
state engineer's office would then order upstream junior appropriators to cease diverting
water until the downstream senior appropriator filled his quota. The administration of
priorities is still an annual occurrence in
appropriation states. 9 The relative ease with
which priorities are administered gives senior
appropriations their real value.

FUTURE ISSUES

The appropriation doctrine is a true institutional innovation, and is much better suited
to semiarid and arid regions than is riparianism.lO Water may be used wherever it is most
needed without regard to whether the land
borders a stream. Appropriators who undertake significant investment in water-using
facilities know that their water right will be
legally protected regarding subsequent uses. In
most states a senior appropriator's right will be
enforced by state water administrators rather
than through private litigation. The result is
that early water users enjoy substantial security in their water rights. Later appropriators
will be able to acquire needed water either
through impoundment or, as discussed below,
by purchasing existing senior appropriations.
The appropriation doctrine has not been
without its critics. A principal criticism has
been that the doctrine hinders the economic
transfer of water rights from older uses,
typically irrigation, to more current industrial
(principally energy development) and municipal needs. II This criticism is generally unfounded since most western states have
established administrative procedures for allowing water rights to be sold to accommodate
new users.12 A second criticism, that appropriation does not facilitate protection of environmental values, reflects not so much a flaw in
the appropriative theory itself as it does a
political reluctance, primarily on the part of
irrigators, to allocate water for environmental
purposes. A third criticism, better justified, is
that appropriation has encouraged inefficient
water use. This feature of appropriation has
been reinforced through federally subsidized
water projects. A final (and, in this writer's
opinion, the most important) criticism concerns appropriation's inability to deal with
groundwater depletion.

Water-use efficiency. In 1975, 83 percent of
the fresh water consumed in the U.S. was used
for crop irrigatkm. II This figure rose to more
than 90 percent in the West. Appropriation is
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at least partly responsible for discouraging the
adoption of water-saving techniques in irrigation, the largest consumptive use of water in
the West and in the nation. Use of irrigation
scheduling techniques could result in significantly reduced irrigation water demands. 14 As
it is, an appropriation authorizes the holder to
use a specific quantity of water for a specific
use on a specific quantity of land. If the
appropriator uses his water more efficiently he
cannot apply the saved water on additional
land: he must acquire an additional appropriation to do SO.15 Because of the temporal priority
rule, the appropriator is likely to lose the saved
water to other water users, i.e., existing
appropriators on the same stream. The appropriator therefore has little incentive to increase
water-use efficiency.
The rationale for this rule is that prohibiting the use of water saved through conservation techniques protects downstream users.
When water is used for irrigation, some is
evaporated and some is transpired by the crop.
The rest, at least in theory, finds its way back
to the stream as return flows, either as
overland runoff or as percolation into a
groundwater reservoir that may feed the
stream. If an appropriator is allowed to increase the number of acres he or she can
irrigate with a fixed amount of water, the
quantity of water transpired in crop production will increase (unless the irrigator shifts to
crops using less water), and return flows will be
reduced correspondingly. In other words, the
consumptive use of the water is increased at
the expense of downstream appropriators.
Appropriative water rights are based on
the notion of beneficial use; i.e., use without
unnecessary waste. 16 In practice, however, this
theory results in inefficient use, particularly in
irrigation. I; Irrigators are not required to use
the most efficient irrigation methods but only
reasonably efficient methods at the time the
appropriation was initiated. IS Thus, methods
that were reasonable during the 1880s would
pass muster today if employed pursuant to an
1880s appropriation, even though current
practices would require less than half the water

employed using lrngation methods of the
1880s. An interesting question is whether a
change in the legal concept of what practices
are wasteful, i.e., what constitutes a beneficial
use of water, can be legislated retroactively. In
other words, the issue is whether legislatures or
water administrators can require irrigators to
use less water than they have been using.
Although as a matter of theory there seems to
be no legal impediment to this approach,
western legislators and water administrators
have not attempted to force appropriators to
improve their irrigation water-use efficiency.
Requiring all irrigators to employ modern
irrigation scheduling practices and thus to
divert less water has important equity considerations. Under the current adminis~ration of
priorities, during periods of water shortage a
senior appropriator is entitled to receive the
full amount of the appropriation to continue
wasteful irrigation practices even while a
junior appropriator neighbor receives no water
at all. Allowing one irrigator to waste while
another does without when there is enough for
both is unfair and should not constitute a
"beneficial" use of water. Requiring all appropriators to use less water would make more
water available to junior appropriators, especially during periods of shortage, and would
result in a more equitable distribution of
available water supplies.
Groundwater Depletion. Perhaps the greatest
failure of appropriation has been with regard
to groundwater depletion, although the western states using the most groundwater do not
apply the appropriation doctrine to it. 19 Under
prior appropriation, senior appropriators generally are entitled to administrative protection
when junior appropriators interfere with their
water withdrawals. Most appropriation states,
however, provide more limited protection to
senior appropriators. For example, new
groundwater appropriations may be prohibited or limited if they would interfere with
senior appropriations. A common approach,
limiting withdrawals to maintain "reasonable
pumping depths," although it would not
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necessarily maintain a senior appropriator's
original pumping depth, guarantees that water
levels will not fall below his economic reach.
To take logic to an extreme, junior groundwater appropriators could be forced to, in
effect, abandon their wells when their pumping threatens to deplete the supply for senior
groundwater appropriators.
Again, this raises the unpleasant specter of
requiring a senior appropriator to demand that
a neighboring junior appropriator cease pumping groundwater so that the senior appropriator can continue an inefficient use. A more
appropriate method would be to require all
appropriators to employ more efficient methods of water use in order to allow junior
appropriators to share in groundwater use.
States have been reluctant to come to grips
with the problem of groundwater depletion.
The typical approach has been to prohibit new
groundwater uses in areas where groundwater
supplies are being depleted but not to regulate
existing uses. This policy penalizes those who
have done nothing to cause depletion and
rewards those who have caused the problem
by allowing them to monopolize the remaining
supply. In part, this policy reflects federal
reclamation policies, in place for many years
when the federal government stood ready to
build a reclamation project primarily at federal
expense for any irrigators who wanted one. 20
Such an apparently generous (but shortsighted) policy discouraged states from taking
the unpleasant step of regulating existing
groundwater use in order to extend the
physical and economic life of groundwater
supplies and thereby protect the local and
regional economies that depend on irrigation.
The recent High Plains Study conclusions and
current political concerns for reducing federal
spending and the federal deficit, however,
suggest that the federal government's generous
reclamation policies will be no more. The
study concluded that the cost of rescuing the
High Plains region from groundwater depletion through importing Missouri River water
to the Great Plains states of Texas, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas was too

expensive for even the federal government to
undertake. Similarly, the Reagan administration has promulgated new guidelines and costsharing requirements for evaluating the economic benefits of proposed water projects. The
new cost benefit formula would require net
national economic benefits from project construction before federal project funding could
be obtained. In the Great Plains such projects
would be used to grow surplus crops, primarily
feed grains. Given the high costs of agricultural price support programs, there seems to be
little national economic benefit in subsidizing
irrigation of crops of which there is already an
overabundance.
Once western states realize that federal
rescue projects are a thing of the past, they
may begin to deal more realistically with
groundwater depletion. When they do so they
are likely to conclude that requiring irrigators
to employ a higher degree of water-use efficiency is an indispensable element in new state
groundwater policies. Although the appropriation doctrine is flexible enough to accommodate these legal changes, state legislators and
water administrators must have the political
courage to make these changes to prevent
groundwater depletion. If changes are not
made, the appropriation doctrine will lose the
evolutionary resiliency that has characterized
its historical development.
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3. For a discussion of prior appropriation, see
Hutchins, Water Rights Laws, I: 157-78.
4. Elements of appropriation in Arizona and
New Mexico were based on Spanish law, although
Hutchins suggests that this was limited only to
authorizing nonriparian uses and did not include
the important concept of temporal priority among
appropriators. Elements of appropriation law, including temporal priority, developed in the Mor-

44 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1988

mon settlement of Utah. The influence of Spanish
and Mormon water allocation doctrines was limited, however, whereas the California, Colorado,
and Wyoming doctrines influenced the water law
development of all seventeen continental western
states, including New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah.
Hutchins, Water Rights Laws, I: 160-63.
5. For an excellent account of the California
gold rush and its impact on the development of the
appropriation doctrine, see McGowen, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain,
11 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1956).
6. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
7. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
8. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443
(1882).
9. A few appropriation states, notably California, do not have a statewide system of administrative enforcement of priorities.
10. Trelease, Water Law, and People: The Role of
Water Law in Conserving and Developing Natural
Resources in the West, 18 Wyo. L.J. 3 (1963).
11. National Water Commission, New Directions in U. S. Water Policy at 124-26 (1973).
12. Nebraska is a notable exception: surface
water rights can be sold there only if they are used
for the same purpose in the same river basin. Thus,
new industrial and/or municipal uses cannot be
accommodated legally through the sale of surface
water appropriations. This antiquated approach
exists in Nebraska because of the general availability
of groundwater to satisfy municipal and industrial
water demands.
13. C. Murray and E. Reeves, Estimated Water

Use in the United States in 1975 (U. S. Geol. Survey
Cir. No. 765, 1977) at 8.
14. For a discussion of water use efficiency, see
Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and
Western Water Rights Reform: An Overview, 59
Neb. L.Rev. 327, 329-33 (1980).
15. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v.
Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966);
Dickinson, Installation of Water Saving Devices as a
Means of Enlarging an Appropriative Right to Use
Water, 24 Nat. Res. Law. 272 (1969).
16. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws, I: 489-503,
506-14, 545-46.
17. Ibid., I: 514-15. Some (but not all) western
states have supplemented this legal definition of
beneficial use with an enumeration of specific
beneficial uses.
18. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr.
Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489,45 P.2d 972 (1935); Hutchins,
Water Rights Laws I: 644-50.
19. For a discussion of groundwater depletion,
see Aiken, Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53
Colo. L.Rev. 505 (1983). California, Texas, and
Nebraska represented approximately 60 percent of
total groundwater withdrawals in the West in 1975,
according to Aiken, 334-35n41. None of these states
apply appropriation to groundwater, while all other
Great Plains and western states do.
20. For a discussion of federal reclamation
policies and groundwater depletion, see Aiken, New
Directions in Nebraska Water Policy, 66 Neb. L.Rev.
8, 11-19,40-48,50-53,74-75 (1987).

